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Abstract
In an overlapping generations (OLG) setup we address the issue of the optimal num-
ber of property rights to allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize
the stock of the natural resource at the steady state. We assume that the effect of the
enforced property rights regime on the evolution of the resource is twofold: through
biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to lo-
cal communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the
strategic setting is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A fiscal policy
able to decentralize the cooperative outcome is studied.
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1 Introduction
That unlimited open access to public resources leads to the “tragedy of the commons” is
a well-known result. Hardin [15] conceptualizes the idea of the tragedy of the commons
by means of a grazing example, assuming that the pasture is open to all and that there is
no cooperation among the users.1 Each herder will therefore try to keep as many livestock
as possible. Since the individual benefit for each herder of adding one animal is larger
than the social cost of overgrazing, she will continue to add one more animal, which finally
will bring ruin to all. In order to internalize the externality stemming from the over-
exploitation of public resources, Hardin suggests two different options: either selling them
off as private property, or keeping them as public property and allocating the right to enter
them. However, there is an important, unanswered question in Hardin’s paper: how many
property rights should be allocated?
Hardin’s paper has been used to explain resource degradation and led national govern-
ments to put restrictions on the local systems of resource management. For instance, since
the mid-80s many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have introduced
some forms of decentralized forest management (see Baland and Platteau [3]).2 Advocates
of decentralization justify decentralization reforms on the grounds that the increased ef-
ficiency, equity and inclusion that should arise from decentralization result in better and
more sustainable management. Despite these claims, many case studies suggest that de-
centralization efforts often ended up with deforestation or depletion of natural resources.
Ostrom [26] shows that under certain conditions, when communities are given the right to
self-organise they can democratically govern themselves to preserve the environment.
Therefore, it seems of some interest to investigate how the allocation of property rights
advocated by Hardin as a solution to over-exploitation of public, natural resources can be
conciliated with the empirical evidence that decentralization often led to ecological exhaus-
tion. In other words, to move beyond Hardin’s theory, we need to identify key variables
present or absent in particular settings, so as to understand successes and failures (Basurto
and Omstrom [5]).
1It is important to stress since the beginning that Hardin [15] gets the idea for his basic argument that
common property systems allow individuals to benefit at a cost to the community from the Oxford economist,
the Rev William Forster Lloyd who in 1833 in his book Two Lectures on the Checks of Population writes:
“If a person puts more cattle into his own field, the amount of the subsistence which they consume is all
deducted from that which was at the command of his original, [...] but if he puts more cattle on a common,
the food which they consume forms a deduction which is shared between all the cattle, as well that of others
as his own stock”. Hardin takes Lloyd’s observation and transforms it by injecting the added ingredient
of “tragic” inevitability: “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”. When Hardin writes his article, the
consequences arising from the open access to a natural resource have already been analyzed by Gordon [14],
in the field of the overexploitation of fisheries. Gordon’s article is more rigorous than Hardin’s, however
Hardin’s article has become one of the most cited (and criticized) academic papers ever published. Part of
the success of his article is that it uses pithy, nontechnical examples and a controversial argument concerning
human population growth.
2Decentralization is usually defined as a process by which more authority and control over resources are
given to lower levels of government.
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One element that seems to be important when analyzing resource management is the
existence of biomass externalities across property rights’ owners. Meade [23] introduces the
concept of “positive externality” in the presence of a well-defined property rights regime:
he imagines a beekeeper who lives next to an apple orchard. In the course of making honey,
his bees provide a benefit in terms of pollination to the orchard owner next to him. At
the same time, however, the production of additional apples would also make more nectar
available for the bees, thus resulting in a greater production of honey. Meade’s example,
in which the crops of the farmer depend on the number of bees owned by the beekeeper
and vice versa, makes clear the existence of spillovers across property rights’ owners.3 This
concept has been further developed both in fish and forest management. In Datta and
Mirman [11] and Fischer and Mirman [16], the growth rate of a natural resource depends,
inter alia, on how the resource is managed; and the common property regime defined over
the resource affects the evolution of the resource itself.4 While in forest management,
mostly theoretical studies have suggested that individual forest landowners receive amenity
benefits from adjacent stands (Bowes and Krutilla [6]; Swallow and Wear [33]; Amacher et
al. [1]). Recently, Vokoun et al. [34] use a landowner survey data to examine incentives to
cooperate concerning joint forest management and coordination of harvesting. Their results
confirm that cross parcel externalities modeled in theoretical works do in fact exist. They
also find spatial factors to be particularly important to induce landowners to participate in
cooperative agreements.
How can we take advantage of both Hardin’s theory on property rights and the existence
of spillovers amongst private owners (such that the boundaries of private titles and the
boundaries of the impacts of resource use may not coincide) to understand successes and
failures in resource management? In fact, we could assert that defining property rights
and dividing the natural resource in fenced plots plays an important role in influencing the
evolution of the resource itself. On the one hand it reduces the overall maintenance costs;
but on the other hand it makes biological spillovers among plots less likely to occur, thus
having a negative impact on the natural growth rate of the resource.
The major issue is then to define the optimal number of plots that allows to maximize
the stock of the natural resource. Of course, this analysis must take into account the
sensitivity of the natural resource to the property rights regime defined over it. There are
natural resources which are extremely reactive to the way the resource itself is split, so that
splitting the resource is always detrimental for its natural evolution. We call this Meade
effect. On the contrary, there are other resources whose natural growth rate is affected to a
smaller extent by the property rights regime defined over them. We call this Hardin effect.
We address this issue in an overlapping generations (OLG) framework. We assume that
3See also Cheung [8] and Johnson [19].
4A common property regime is used to refer to a property rights arrangement in which a group of resource
users (e.g. a community) share duties and right towards the resource.
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a central government is entitled to assign property rights over a natural resource: at each
time t the resource is divided into Dt plots. Each plot is assigned to a community that must
manage it. Within each community, at each time t a representative young and a represen-
tative old agent exist: the young agent harvests the resource, while the old agent owns the
capital. Both the natural resource and the capital are used for production. We compare
the result obtained in the strategic setting to that arising in a cooperative framework. We
show that the gain from cooperation is always remarkable. A fiscal policy able to decen-
tralize the cooperative outcome has then been studied and some policy implications have
been stressed. It has also been shown that cooperation alone is not enough to maximize the
stock of the resource in the steady state. However, assuming that the number of property
rights is fixed, by means of a subsidy and for any given D it is possible to replicate in the
strategic setup the maximum level of the natural resource reached in the cooperative frame-
work. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we sketch the model. In Section 3 we
analyze the extraction problem in a Cournot-Nash framework. In Section 4 we characterize
the same problem in a cooperative framework. Section 5 describes the fiscal policy needed
to decentralize the cooperative outcome. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We assume that a central government is entitled to assign property rights over a natural
resource. At each time t, the stock of the resource is split amongst Dt ≥ 1 plots. The
enforced property rights regime is assumed to influence the evolution of the resource through
two different channels. First of all, the way the resource is split affects the natural growth
rate: the higher is the number of plots, the less likely are the biological spillovers amongst
plots and the lower is the growth rate of the resource. Second, the higher the number
of plots, the lower are maintenance (monitoring) costs. The interplay of these two effects,
combined with agents’ decisions, will shape the evolution of the resource at the steady state.
According to the way a resource reacts to the interplay of these effects, we can define the
Meade effect and the Hardin effect : in the first case, the resource is extremely reactive to
the enforced property rights regime, so that splitting it into plots is always detrimental for
the evolution of the resource itself. In the second case, the resource is less reactive to the
way property rights are allocated.5
The proper management of a renewable resource must be based on the knowledge of
its population dynamics, which can be furthered through the use of mathematical models.
The evolution over time of a renewable resource is generally modeled through the use
of a differential equation using a logistic growth function with simple density-dependence.
5Copeland and Taylor [10], in a paper where they study the degree to which countries escape the tragedy
of the commons, define as Hardin economies those countries that have limited enforced power relative to
their overcapacity and always exhibit de facto open access in steady state.
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Despite being a good, stylized approximation of population dynamics of renewable resources,
a number of factors which influence actual growth patterns are ignored in this model,
including the age structure of the resource, random influences, as well as the spatial structure
of the resource (see Perman [28]). According to a logistic function specification, everything
else being equal, an area being twice as big as another one should have a population of
twice the size, i.e. the population density should be the same, which need not be true in
reality (see Andre´n [2]).
In this work we will use a different specification. Let Xt be the stock of the renewable
resource at time t, and Dt ≥ 1 the number of plots at time t. Each plot is then assigned
to a community that has property rights over it and must manage it. Communities are
assumed to be identical. The rule governing the natural resource dynamics is given by
Xt+1 = [Xt(1 + b(Dt))− Yt]α (1)
where Yt is total harvesting at time t, b(Dt) is the growth rate of the natural resource at
time t, which depends negatively on the number of plots at time t, Dt, and α ∈ (0, 1).
Equation (1) departs from differential equations using logistic growth function in order to
include the spatial structure of the resource when studying its dynamics. The spatial struc-
ture of natural resources refers to the relative spatial arrangements of patches into which
the resource is split and interconnection between them (Baskent and Jordan [4]). Since the
mid-70s the ecological literature has pointed out the important role played by the spatial
structure of renewable resources in conservation strategies. In 1975 the ecologist Jared Dia-
mond [13] analyzes the problem of choosing a size and shape of natural reserves that would
minimize the loss of species. He lists several considerations, including economic and social
ones, and among the rules proposed is that single large preserves would be better at pre-
serving species than a set of smaller, separate reserves of the same total area. If subdivision
cannot be avoided then corridors should be left to connect areas so that populations could
move between them. In 1980, the World Conservation Strategy [18] reproduces Diamond’s
suggested principles for nature reserve design, with the general recommendation that a
large reserve is better than a small one. In the ’90s the concept of spatial structure and
landscape ecology have been widely used to explain biodiversity loss. In particular, habitat
fragmentation has been seen, through its three major components (namely, loss of the orig-
inal habitat, reduction in habitat patch size, and increasing isolation of habitat patches),
as a cause of the decline in biological diversity within the original habitat (see Wilcox [35]
and Wilcox and Murphy [36]). The negative effect of fragmentation on the growth of the
resource, as assumed by the cited literature, it is taken into account by Assumption 1
Assumption 1 b(Dt) : R
+ → R+ is C1. b′(Dt) < 0, ∀Dt ≥ 1.
Assumption 1 states that, at each time t, b(Dt) is decreasing in the number of plots: it
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reflects the idea that biological spillovers amongst plots have an impact on the natural
growth rate of the resource. An increase in the number of plots makes biological spillovers
less likely to occur, which has in turn a negative effect on the growth rate of the resource.
Its growth rate is then the strongest when the spillovers are at their maximum level, which
occurs when D = 1.
As we will see later, the sensitivity of the natural growth rate b(D) to the property rights
regime depends on the considered resource. There are cases in which splitting the resource
into plots is highly detrimental to the growth rate of the resource itself, and other cases in
which the enforced property rights regime influences the growth rate of the resource in a
milder way.
As in the standard OLG setting, in each period and within each community there are
two cohorts living two periods: the young and the old. Since we are not interested in
intra-community externalities, we assume that at each time t and within each community a
representative young agent and a representative old agent coexist. Following Mirman and To
[25], we make the assumption that only the young can harvest: we denote by yit the harvest
of the i−th community at time t. Hence, the total harvest is Yt =
Dt∑
i=1
yit. The representative
young agent of the i− th community either uses part of the harvest as an input for current
consumption, zit, or saves it as capital, k
i
t+1. While the representative young extracts and
owns the resource, the representative old owns capital, which is used, in conjunction with
the resource, to produce the consumption good. As remarked by Mirman and To [25],
this structure gives an incentive to the young to save some of the natural resource: by not
extracting the whole resource, the young agent ensures that she can consume when old.
The following equilibrium constraint must hold
yit − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
= kit+1 + z
i
t (2)
whereXt/Dt is the stock of resource on each plot assigned to each community and h (Xt/Dt)
measures the maintenance costs (in terms of monitoring costs): at each time t, due to these
costs, there is a part of the harvest that cannot be used as input for consumption nor saved
as capital. The function h() satisfies the following properties
Assumption 2 h(Xt/Dt) : R
+ → R+ is C1. h′(xt) > 0, ∀xt. h
(
Xt
1
)
> Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
, ∀Dt >
1.
Here we can clearly see the second effect that the enforced property rights regime produces.
We assume that h() depends positively on the current stock of resource assigned to each
community, xt = Xt/Dt. Moreover, we assume that whenD = 1 the maintenance costs, that
is h (Xt/1), are larger than the sum of the maintenance costs over plots, that isDth (Xt/Dt),
when D > 1. We are not claiming here that any maintenance costs satisfy Assumption 2,
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actually here we are considering a specific class of maintenance costs, like monitoring costs.
Indeed, average monitoring costs are increasing in the stock of the resource in the relative
plot.
Now that the effects of property rights regime on the natural growth rate and on mon-
itoring costs have been introduced and that the harvesting decision of the representative
young agent has been highlighted, it seems worth spending some more words on what we
have previously defined Hardin effect and Meade effect. These two effects encompass the
way the evolution of the resource reacts to the enforced property rights regime. There are
resources whose evolution is highly affected by the property rights regime defined over it, so
that - if the goal is to maximize the stock of the resource at the steady state - splitting the
resource turns out to be always detrimental. For this kind of resource the so-called Meade
effect always prevails and the peak of the stock of resource is found for D = 1. However,
there are resources whose evolution is only mildly affected by the property right regime, in
a sense that it is possible to maximize the resource stock in the presence of a number of
plots larger than one. This is what we call Hardin effect. It is important to bear in mind
that in our dynamic general equilibrium approach these two effects characterize the resource
in equilibrium, and take into account not only the effect that the enforced property rights
regime has on the balance between the natural resource growth rate, b, and the monitoring
costs function, h, but also its impact on the agents’ harvesting decisions. Considering all
these features together in an equilibrium analysis is the distinct contribution of our paper
to the literature on renewable natural resources.
At time t, the i− th representative young holds zit and the i− th representative old holds
kit, while they both need capital and resource to produce the homogeneous good. Hence,
once harvesting has taken place, a market for k and z opens: the young and the old of all
communities trade the natural resource, z, and the capital, k, to produce a consumption
good, c, using a homogeneous of degree 1 production function G(k, z).6 Assuming that at
time t the number of communities to which plots are assigned is Dt, total supplies for z and
k are Zt =
∑Dt
i=1 z
i
t and Kt =
∑Dt
i=1 k
i
t, respectively.
We assume that in each community the maximization problem faced by the young agent
consists in maximizing her life-cycle utility function. Utility is defined on youth and old-age
consumption, ciyt and c
io
t+1
u(ciyt ) + u(c
io
t+1) (3)
where u is increasing and concave.
As in Mirman and To [25], in each period a two-stage game is played. In the first stage
6Bre´chet and Lambrecht [7] model an OLG economy in which individuals are endowed with a renewable
resource that can be exploited at no cost by the young households and provided to production or bequeathed
to the next generation. They find that the mere existence of a bequest motive does not guarantee a sustain-
able outcome. Further, when the resource is preserved in equilibrium, its level does not necessarily coincide
with the efficient one. Whether the resource stock is too high or too low the capital stock should be lower
than the golden rule level.
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the young agents decide how much to extract taking into account the law of motion of
the natural resource; while in the second stage production takes place and the young and
the old trade on the markets for z and k. The game is solved by backward induction. In
the following section we will analyze the resource’s and agents’ behaviours in a strategic
setting, where we assume that representative young and old agents of each community take
the decisions of the other D − 1 communities’ representative agents as given.
3 Strategic equilibrium
3.1 Competitive marketplace
For the sake of simplicity, as in Mirman and To [25], we assume that u(c) = ln(c) and
G(k, z) = kβz1−β . Let z be the numeraire and p the price of k relative to z. At each time t
the representative young and old agents of the i− th community maximize the consumption
when young and old, respectively. That consists in solving the following maximization
problem for the community i’s representative agent, where the index j stands for young
and old age
max
{kijt ,z
ij
t }
G(kijt , z
ij
t ) j = y, o (4)
s.t.
{
for j = o: zijt ≤ pt(kit − kijt )
for j = y : ptk
ij
t + z
ij
t ≤ zit
As we have already claimed, both the young and the old need capital, k, and natural
resource, z, in order to produce the consumption good, c. A competitive market for k and
z opens and agents trade on this market.
Part of the capital held by the old agent, kit, is used as an input in the production
function, while the remaining part is sold at price pt to buy the natural resource. Similarly,
the representative young agent holds a part of the natural resource, zit, and uses it for
production, while the remaining part is sold to buy capital at price t. Since the production
function is Cobb-Douglas, from the maximization problems of the representative old and
the young agents we get
ziot = (1− β)ptkit (5)
kiot = βk
i
t (6)
ziyt = (1− β)zit (7)
kiyt = β
zit
pt
(8)
Total demand for z and k is given respectively by
Dt∑
i=1
(ziyt + z
io
t ) and
Dt∑
i=1
(kiyt + k
io
t ). Market
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clearing conditions imply
Zt = (1− β) [ptKt + Zt]
Kt = β
[
Kt +
Zt
pt
]
Solving for p yields the equilibrium price
pt =
β
1− β
Zt
Kt
(9)
3.2 Strategic resource harvesting
In this strategic resource harvesting equilibrium, at each time t and within each community,
the representative young agent maximizes her own life-cycle utility. We compute the indirect
utility function of the representative young agent belonging to the i− th community
ln ciyt + ln c
io
t+1 = ln(k
iy
t )
β(ziyt )
1−β + ln(kiot+1)
β(ziot+1)
1−β (10)
By substituting Eqs. (5) – (9) into Eq. (10), we can characterize the young’s maximization
problem as follows
max
{zit,k
i
t+1}
ln(1− β)K
β
t
Zβt
zit + lnβ
Z1−βt+1
K1−βt+1
kit+1 (11)
s.t.


Xt+1 =

Xt(1 + b(Dt))− yit −∑
j 6=i
yjt


α
Zt+1 = Zt+1 (Xt+1)
For the sake of simplicity, and following Mirman and To [25], we assume that the equilibrium
value of Zt+1 is a fraction of Xt+1 and is independent of Kt+1.
7 Once the model is solved,
these hypothesis are shown to be consistent with the equilibrium solutions, and therefore
they are fulfilled.8 By solving the maximization problem, one obtains the following9
Xt+1 =

α(1− β)
[
Xt(1 + b(Dt))−Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1)


α
(12)
As it can be seen from Eq. (12), the property rights regime defined over the resource shapes
the natural resource stock Xt+1 in a complex way. First of all, the number of plots at t
7In the general case we would have Zt+1 = Zt+1 (Kt+1, Xt+1), where Zt+1 (Kt+1, Xt+1) is the anticipated
equilibrium value of Zt+1 and (Kt+1, Xt+1) is the t+ 1 state.
8See Appendix 7.1.
9See Appendix 7.1 for algebraic details.
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enters the denominator. The higher Dt, the larger the denominator and the smaller Eq.
(12), other things unchanged. Second, Dt also affects positively Xt+1 through h(·), and
negatively through b(·). So the overall effect is ambiguous.
Example: functional forms for b(D) and h (X/D)
To go further into the analysis we first choose functional forms for both b(D) and h
(
X
D
)
which satisfy Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. Let us consider the following simple func-
tional forms
b(D) = a− cD with a, c > 0
h
(
X
D
)
= e
(
X
D
)2
with e > 0
We thus assume the monitoring costs to be quadratic in the stock of resource assigned to
each plot, where e is a scale parameter. As long as b(D) is concerned, we impose D ≤ a/c
to satisfy Assumption 1. Natural resources whose growth rate is heavily affected by the
enforced property rights regime show high values for the parameter c; while for resources
whose natural growth rate is less sensitive to the property rights regime the opposite is
true. We then set α = 1/2. With these functional forms, Eq. (12) provides the steady state
resource stock, denoted by X∗, as the solution to the following implicit function
Φ(X∗, D)≡
[
1
2
(1− β)+(2D − 1)
]
X∗2−1
2
(1−β)
[
(1 + a− cD)X∗−De
(
X∗
D
)2]
= 0 (13)
The solution to Eq. (13), X∗ = Ψ∗(a, c, e, β,D), defines the stock of the resource in the
steady state in the strategic equilibrium as a function of D and parametrized by the co-
efficients of the model. Equation (13), being a polynomial of degree two, has two distinct
roots (two distinct steady states): X∗a = 0 and
10
X∗b =
D (1 + a− cD) (1− β)
D (4D − 1− β) + e(1− β) (14)
In the following we will concentrate our analysis on the non trivial steady state and we will
denote it by X∗. Before going further, the following proposition establishes uniqueness and
local stability of the steady state.
Proposition 1 In the strategic equilibrium the non trivial steady state is unique. The
steady state is locally stable for D > 124
(
3(1 + β) +
√
48e(1− β) + 9(1 + β)2
)
with e ≤
6(7−β)
1−β .
Proof See Appendix 7.2.
10X∗b turns out to be always positive under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.
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The following Proposition describes the shape of the resource at the steady state in
the strategic setting, depending on the values of the parameter e. As stated earlier, e is a
parameter of scale related to the monitoring costs: the gain from lowering the monitoring
costs by splitting the resource into plots depends on the value of e. When e is sufficiently high
then splitting the resource brings a remarkable reduction in the monitoring costs born by
the communities, which makes the Hardin effect likely to appear, other things unchanged.11
Proposition 2 Under Proposition 1 in the strategic equilibrium,
1. if e ≤ eˆ = 4[4(1+a)−c(1+β)](1−β)(1+a−4c) then X∗ is always decreasing in D.
2. if eˆ < e < ˆˆe = (a/c)
2[4(1+a)−c(1+β)]
(1−β)(1−a) with (a/c) > 2 then X
∗ is first increasing and then
decreasing in D.
3. if e ≥ ˆˆe then X∗ is always increasing in D.
Proof See Appendix 7.3.
In Proposition 2 the balance between Hardin and Meade effects is clearly stated: when
the condition of Proposition 2.1 is satisfied, the latter prevails and X∗ turns out to be
always decreasing in D. On the contrary, in Proposition 2.2 the Hardin effect prevails for
small enough values of D, while for large enough values of D the Meade effect is at work.
Finally, in Proposition 2.3 the Hardin effect is always prevalent. However, the Hardin effect
is unlikely to always prevail for all D ≥ 2,12 such that the X∗ curve that describes the
profile of the resource in the steady state as a function of D is always increasing (as stated
in Proposition 2.3). The reasoning behind this intuition is the following. Let us denote
by X∗2 the steady-state level of the natural resource at D = 2 and let us assume that the
resource initially shows the Hardin effect, such that X∗3 > X
∗
2 . At D = 3 the growth
rate of the resource is still high (since, under a Hardin regime, the natural growth rate of
the resource is only slightly influenced by the property right regime - especially when the
number of plots is low). Nevertheless, at the same time, monitoring costs are high, which
represents an incentive for decentralization and increasing the number of plots into which
the resource is split. Let us assume then that the maximum stock of the natural resource
is reached for a D = s > 2. After that point, the number of plots will become high enough
to have a significant detrimental impact on b(D). This effect, along with low monitoring
costs, will reduce the stock of the resource and lead eventually to over-exploitation, that is
X∗s+1 < X
∗
s . In this case, for small enough values of D the Hardin effect is at work, and
thereafter the Meade effect shall prevail.
11Of course, in alternative and in similar way, in Proposition 2 we could have looked et the behaviour of
c, that is the parameter that captures the sensitivity of the resource growth rate to the defined property
rights regime.
12Since we are in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium it is natural to consider the case D ≥ 2.
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To illustrate how the enforced property rights regime can influence the evolution of
the natural resource at the steady state (through its general equilibrium effects on b, h
and agents’ harvesting decisions), we now set numerical values for the parameters. Let us
assume that a = 0.95, c = 0.08 and β = 0.52. We are then able to study the effect the
parameter e associated to the monitoring costs has on the resource stock level in the steady
state. Let us now consider the plot of X∗ where a = 0.95, c = 0.08, β = 0.52, while e is
either 63 (see left panel of Figure 1) or 0.1 (see right panel of Figure 1).
The two panels in Figure 1 illustrate Proposition 2 for two different natural resources.
In the former case (left panel) the Hardin and Meade effects are balanced for a D > 2, while
in the latter case (right panel) the Meade effect dominates for any allocation of property
rights.
Figure 1: Hardin vs Meade: X∗ when e = 63 (left panel) and when e = 0.1 (right panel).
Other parameters: a = 0.95, c = 0.08 and β = 0.52.
The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the case of a resource whose natural evolution is
mildly affected by the property rights regime when D is small enough, so that the Hardin
effect dominates. When e = 63, for values of D small enough, X∗ is first increasing in D,
it attains its maximum (X∗max = 0.04) for D = 3, and then it decreases because the Meade
effect starts dominating.13
In the right panel of Figure 1 the resource dynamics are always dominated by the Meade
effect. It is the case where e = 0.1, the values of the other parameters being kept unchanged,
and it represents a natural resource characterized by strong biological interactions. In such
a case, splitting the resource severely harms its natural dynamics. The effect of D on the
monitoring costs prevails for every D > 2. The maximum stationary level of the resource
stock, X∗max = 0.147, is reached for D = 2. In other words, if the objective is to maximize
the level of the resource in the steady state, then it can be achieved by splitting the resource
13The stock of the resource at the steady state is actually maximized for a D = 2.7 but, since D can
assume only integer values, in the remaining of the analysis we will consider the nearest integer value to the
maximizing D, in this case D = 3.
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in two plots.
Some more hints can be gotten from the comparison of these two cases. First, when
the resource is more sensitive to the property rights regime, its maximal stationary level is
higher (0.135 vs 0.04). However, in this case the resource stock decreases faster with D,
and it reaches a size comparable to the one of a less reactive resource as soon as D ≥ 8.
In a strategic framework, biological spillovers are not internalized and each community
takes the decision of the other D − 1 communities as given. This can cause a suboptimal
use of the resource and eventually leads to over-exploitation. If biological spillovers are
at work and if each plot interacts with all neighbouring parcels, then the boundaries of
the community’s resource titles do not coincide with the boundaries of the impact of the
resource use, and hence the appropriate geographical scale for decision-making is wider than
the community area. The issue is then about the coordination of decisions at the relevant
geographical scale. In the following section we will study the case where communities decide
to cooperate and analyze how this behaviour shapes the resource dynamics.
4 Cooperative equilibrium
Let us now consider the case where communities cooperate.14 Cooperation amongst com-
munities characterizes the resource harvesting problem; while as for the competitive mar-
ketplace game we use the solution derived in Section 3.1. Here we will also be able to depict
the case D = 1 as a special case in the cooperative setting.
4.1 The natural resource harvesting problem
Let us consider the number of communities as given. The indirect utility function to be
maximized is
ln ciyt + ln c
io
t+1 = ln(k
iy
t )
β(ziyt )
1−β + ln(kiot+1)
β(ziot+1)
1−β (15)
By substituting Eqs. (5) – (9) into Eq. (15), we characterize the maximization problem as
follows
max
zit,k
i
t+1
ln(1− β)K
β
t
Zβt
zit + lnβ
Z1−βt+1
K1−βt+1
kit+1 (16)
s.t.
{
Xt+1 =
(
Xt(1 + b(Dt))−Dtyit
)α
Zt+1 = Zt+1 (Xt+1)
The novelty in this problem is that, while in the Cournot-Nash setting each representa-
tive within a community takes the harvesting decisions of the other D − 1 communities’
14Klosowski et al. [20] carry out a conjoint analysis to study the probability that coordinated management
programmes would be undertaken. Results show that this probability depends on a number of factors of
which the most important are tax incentives, the number of parties and the incentive to defect from the
agreement (which is related to the difference between the payoffs under the Nash and cooperative equilibria).
See also Gluck [17] for a review on collective property regimes.
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representatives as given, here she is aware that Yt = Dty
i
t. By solving the maximization
problem we end up with Eq. (17), which represents the law of motion of the resource in the
cooperative setting15
Xt+1 =

α(1− β)
[
(1 + b(Dt))Xt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
α(1− β) + 1


α
(17)
By comparing Eq. (12) with Eq. (17), one can notice that the effect of D on the
denominator disappears in the latter. However, the overall effect of D remains ambiguous,
as D enters Eq. (17) through b(.) and Dh(.). In other words, in the cooperative setting the
externality arising from the strategic behaviour is internalized, but the effects of D on b(.)
and h(.) are still at work. Even in this framework then changing the property rights regime
would change the resource stock. As in the Cournot-Nash setting, we assume α = 1/2.
Plugging the functional forms for b(.) and h(.) into Eq. (17) and evaluating it in the steady
state provides us with the follow implicit function
ΦC(D,XC) ≡
[
1
2
(1− β) + 1
]
XC
2 − 1
2
(1− β)
[
(1 + a− cD)XC −De
(
XC
D
)2]
= 0 (18)
The solution to Eq. (18), XC = ΨC(a, c, e, β,D), defines the resource stock in the steady
state in the cooperative equilibrium as a function of D and the parameters. Eq. (18) is a
polynomial of degree two, with two distinct roots. One is trivial, XCa = 0, while the other,
XC2 , is given by
XCb =
D [(1 + a− cD)(1− β)]
D(3− β) + e(1− β) (19)
In the following, we will concentrate on the non trivial steady state and, for the sake of
brevity, we will denote it by XC . Let us briefly compare Eq. (14) and Eq. (19). As one
can easily see, it turns out that XC is always larger than X∗, since the numerator of the
two equations is the same, while the denominator in Eq. (14) is always bigger than in Eq.
(19). This implies that in the cooperative framework, for a given D, a higher level of the
natural resource is reached.
Proposition 3 In the cooperative equilibrium the non trivial steady state is unique. The
steady state is locally stable for D > e(1−β)3(3−β) with e ≥
3(3−β)
1−β .
Proof See Appendix 7.5.
This leads us to our next result.
Proposition 4 Under Proposition 3 in the cooperative equilibrium,
15See Appendix 7.4 for algebraic details.
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1. if e ≤ e˜ = c(3−β)(1−β)(1+a−2c) then X∗ is always decreasing in D.
2. if e˜ < e < ˜˜e = c(3−β)(1−β)(1−a) with (a/c) > 2 then X
∗ is first increasing and then decreasing
in D.
3. if e ≥ ˜˜e then X∗ is always increasing in D.
Proof See Appendix 7.6.
Clearly, Proposition 4 parallels Proposition 2. Both provide necessary conditions for
the Hardin or the Meade effect to prevail. Although similar in their content, these two
propositions differ in the range of values for the parameter e. In particular, it can be easily
shown that eˆ > e˜ always holds.16 This means that the Hardin effect is much more likely to
appear when communities cooperate, even for small values of e, which is a good news for
the resource stock and must be seen as an ancillary result to cooperation.
It is useful to display X∗ and XC on the same graph, as shown in Figure 2: in each plot
the resource stock under strategic and cooperative equilibrium is displayed. The left panel
refers to the case where the Hardin effect is initially at work; while in the right panel the
Meade effect always prevails.
Figure 2: Strategic vs cooperative behavior: X∗ (solid line) and XC (dashed line) with
e = 63 (left panel) and with e = 0.1 (right panel). Other parameters: a = 0.95, c = 0.08 and
β = 0.52.
The first result that comes out from Fig. 2 is that, whatever the resource dynamics
(left or right panel), the resource stock is higher in the cooperative equilibrium than in the
strategic equilibrium (in both panels the dashed curve always lies above the solid curve).
This is not unexpected, of course, because under cooperation the communities internalize
the externality arising from the Cournot-Nash behavior. Nevertheless, it is striking to
compare the order of magnitude of the inefficiency due to the strategic interactions and the
one due to the biological spillovers. Let us analyze further these results.
16The condition ensuring that eˆ > e˜ is c < 1 + a, which is always satisfied under Assumption 1.
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As far as the left plot is concerned, we can see that the D which maximizes the stock
of the resource under the Cournot-Nash setting (D = 8) is different from the D which
maximizes the stock under the cooperative behaviour (D = 3). Put it differently, when
communities cooperate the maximum level of the resource is found for a larger number of
plots. As for the evolution of the resource, the gain springing from cooperation is con-
siderable, since the maximum level of XC (that is XCmax) is about 2.5 times as large as
the maximum level of X∗ (that is X∗max), and this difference becomes even wider for large
enough values of D (with XC being almost six times as large as X∗ when D = 10). Given
the values of the parameters the cooperative steady state turns out to be stable for D ≥ 4.17
Let us now analyze the case of a resource which is very sensitive to the enforced prop-
erty rights regime also for small values of D. This is the case where the Meade effect
always prevails: interactions between plots are strong and splitting the resource is highly
detrimental. As a consequence, the maximum level of the resource is reached when D = 1
(XCmax = 0.364). As in the Cournot-Nash framework, also in the cooperative equilibrium
the maximum level reached by a very sensitive resource is higher than a less sensitive re-
source’s (0.364 vs 0.101). Due to this high sensitivity to the enforced property rights regime,
however, the resource is depleted fast and severely as D increases. Finally, the proportional
gain of cooperating is comparable to the one obtained in the case of a less sensitive resource.
In both cases, it is worth stressing that the gain from cooperation (that is, jumping
vertically from the solid curve to the dashed one for a given D) is larger than the one that
would be obtained by simply tuning D in the strategic setting, so as to maximize the stock
of the resource (that is, moving along the solid curve).
It is also worth drawing attention to the case where the parameter e takes intermedi-
ate values, let us say e = 15. The result is displayed in Figure 3. This figure shows the
case where Hardin meets Meade. In the previous cases (see Figure 2) the same arbitrage be-
tween Hardin and Meade held both in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium and in the cooperative
equilibrium: XC and X∗ were bell-shaped functions of D in the case of a poorly sensitive
resource, and monotonically decreasing functions of D in the case of a more sensitive re-
source. However, we see here that this balance is not a pure technological or biological
effect, merely reflecting a feature of the natural resource, but that it also depends on the
market outcome.
When e = 15, in the non-cooperative setting the negative impact of D on the natural
growth rate always prevails, so that the resource reaches its maximum when D = 2, and
then monotonically decreases. Hence, it looks like a highly sensitive resource, as discussed
above. Yet, under cooperation the resource behaves like a low sensitive resource as it first
increases in D, reaches a maximum at D = 6, and then monotonically decreases in D.
17It goes without saying that the magnitude of the difference between XC and X∗ depends on the values
of the parameters. Some sensitivity analyses show that the qualitative results hold. Our analysis should
be valued more from a qualitative than a quantitative point of view, meaning that cooperation entails a
remarkable gain in terms of stationary resource stock.
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Figure 3: When Hardin meets Meade: X∗ (solid line) and XC (dashed line) with e = 15.
Other parameters: a = 0.95, c = 0.08 and β = 0.52.
This case clearly shows how the Hardin and Meade effects not only encompass the balance
between the impacts of the number of plots on the natural growth rate of the resource and
on the maintenance costs, but also the agents’ harvesting decisions in equilibrium. In other
words, it is shown how the same natural resource can behave differently and give birth to
the Hardin or Meade effects depending on the decisions taken by the agents in equilibrium.
More generally, from these three cases (Figure 1 and Figure 2) we have learnt that hav-
ing a good understanding of the resource’s characteristics is key to manage it efficiently.
However, the assignment of property rights and its implications in terms of strategic inter-
actions may be even more important for sustainability. Furthermore, it has also been shown
that no property rights regime can be as efficient as cooperation. This result questions the
idea discussed at the beginning of the paper, that the resource stock could be maximized
by choosing the appropriate property rights regime. If correcting for the strategic interac-
tions is much more efficient than simply tuning the number of allocated property rights in
a strategic setting, then an additional instrument is required.
5 Fiscal policy in support of property rights
In the previous section we have shown that the steady state resource stock cannot be higher
in the strategic equilibrium than in the cooperative one, whatever the assignment of property
rights. This suggests that changing the property rights regime defined on the resource has
some effects on its size, but that it cannot be sufficient to maximize the resource stock. To
fill the inefficiency gap between non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes, an additional
policy instrument is required. Finding such an instrument is the purpose of this section.
Let us assume that, besides the assignment of property rights, the government is also
able to levy a lump-sum transfer ω (which can be positive or negative). In such a case Eq.
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(3) becomes
yit − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
= kit+1 + z
i
t + ω (20)
The following government’s budget constraint must hold:
Dtω = θptKt (21)
This budget constraint means that, if ω > 0, then the tax revenue is distributed through
a subsidy on capital. Otherwise, the positive transfer ω > 0 is financed through a tax
on capital. By solving the agent maximization problem18 we end up with the following
equation, which defines the steady-state level of the resource, Xω, in the presence of a
lump-sum tax ω as a function of D:
Φω(D,Xω) ≡ Xω2
[
(2D − 1) + 1
2
(1− β)
]
− 1
2
(1 + b(D))(1− β)Xω+
+
1
2
(1− β)D
(
h
(
Xω
D
)
+ ω
)
= 0 (22)
The solution to Eq. (22), Xω = Ψω(a, c, e, β,D), defines the resource stock in the steady
state in the cooperative equilibrium as a function of D and the parameters. Eq. (22) is a
polynomial of degree two which, for every ω 6= 0, has two distinct, non trivial roots: Xωa
and Xωb .
19 The ω which decentralizes the cooperative outcome in a strategic setting with
fiscal policy is found by imposing
Xωa,b = X
C
which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 There exists e > 0 such that, for every D ≥ 2, the unique positive and
stable steady state replicates the cooperative equilibrium with a lump-sum transfer ω∗(D)
given by:
ω(D)∗ = −4D(D − 1)(1 + a− cD)
2(1− β)
(D(3− β) + e(1− β))2 < 0 (23)
Proof See Appendix 7.8
The level of ω∗ depends on the defined property rights regime and, according to Propo-
sition 5, turns out to be a subsidy financed through a tax on capital. Actually, young
agents should receive a subsidy from the government in order to restrain themselves from
harvesting too much so as to reach the resource stock level that would be attained under full
cooperation. Such a finding is consistent with many empirical evidence, e.g. Chomitz et al.
[9], Pagiola [27] or Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. [31]. For example, in Costa Rica in the late ’90s
18Computations are given in Appendix 7.7.
19See Appendix 7.8 for the values of Xωa and X
ω
b .
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the government launched a program of payments for environmental services. The payments
were given to communities and private landowners for reforestation and sustainable forest
management (see Lambin and Meyfroidt [21]). The subsidy level ω∗ is such that, for every
D ≥ 2, the resource stock in the strategic equilibrium coincides with that in the cooperative
framework.
Interestingly, we can go even further in the analysis. Let us consider that for some
reason, that can be found in the political economy literature, changing the property rights
regime is uneasy for the policy maker. Then, the issue is to find the level of ω (if it exists)
such that, for every given D ≥ 2, the resource stock in the strategic equilibrium coincides
with the maximum resource stock reached in the cooperative equilibrium, denoted by XCmax.
The following corollary shows that such a fiscal policy exists.
Corollary 1 Let D¯ be the number of communities for which the maximum resource stock
level is reached in the cooperative equilibrium. Under Proposition 5, for every D ≥ 2, there
exists ω¯(D) < 0, such that XCmax can be decentralized in the strategic equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix 7.9
6 Conclusion
Hardin’s [15] theory, by depicting a set of herders inexorably trapped in the overuse of their
common pasture, was thought for many years to be typical for common-pool resources not
owned privately or by a government. Hardin has advocated two solutions to prevent future
tragedies: state control or individual ownership. His theory has led national governments
to put restrictions on the local systems of resource management and/or to assign property
rights to individual owners or local communities. However, empirical evidence has showed
that often decentralization and privatization led to over-exploitation of the resources. To
understand successes and failures in the field of resource management we have introduced a
new ingredient: namely, the existence of positive externalities across owners, as depicted by
Meade [23]. The existence of spatial or biological spillovers amongst landowners has been
studied by several theoretical works and recently confirmed by empirical research.
In this paper we have then taken advantage of both Hardin’s theory on property rights
and the existence of spatial spillovers amongst private owners, so that the boundaries of
private titles and the boundaries of the impacts of resource use may not coincide.
We have assumed that defining property rights and dividing the natural resource in
plots plays an important role in influencing the evolution of the resource itself: on the one
hand it reduces the overall maintenance costs, but on the other hand it makes biological
spillovers among plots less likely to occur, thus having a negative impact on the growth rate
of the resource. The central issue became finding the optimal level of plots that maximizes
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the stock of the resource: in this analysis, the sensitivity of the resource to the enforced
property rights regime played a crucial element in explaining the final outcome, since some
resources are more reactive than others.
We have tackled this issue in an OLG framework: we have assumed that at each time
t the natural resource is divided into Dt plots. Each plot is assigned to a community that
owns property rights on it and must manage it. Within each community and at each time
t a representative young and a representative old agent exist: the young agent harvests the
resource, while the old agent owns the capital. Both capital and the natural resource are
used for production. We have first analyzed the problem of over-exploitation in a Cournot-
Nash framework, where each community takes as given the harvesting decisions of the other
D − 1 communities. We have then compared the result obtained in the strategic setting to
that arising in a cooperative framework. It has been shown that the gain from cooperation
is always remarkable. A fiscal policy able to decentralize the cooperative outcome has then
been studied and some policy implications have been stressed. It has also been shown that
cooperation alone is not enough to maximize the stock of the resource in the steady state.
However, assuming that the number of property rights is fixed, by means of a subsidy and
for every given D, it is possible to replicate in the strategic setup the maximum level of the
natural resource reached in the cooperative framework.
7 Appendix
7.1 Strategic resource harvesting in the Cournot-Nash set-up
Equation (11) can be rewritten as follows
ln(1− β) + βlnKt − βlnZt + lnzit + lnβ + (1− β)lnZt+1 − (1− β)lnKt+1 + lnkit+1
The maximization problem is solved by substituting kit+1 = y
i
t − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
− zit and Zt+1 =
ηt+1Xt+1 into Eq. (11). As in the symmetric Nash equilibrium y
i
t = y
j
t and z
i
t = z
j
t
∀i, j = 1...D, we obtain the following first-order conditions with respect to zit and yit
1
zit
− β
Zt
+
1− β
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
− Zt
− 1
yit − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
− zit
= 0 (24)
− α(1− β)
Xt(1 + b(Dt))− Yt −
(1− β)
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
− Zt
+
1
yit − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
− zit
= 0 (25)
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By solving Eq. (24) for Zt we get
Zt =
(Dt − β)
(
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
))
2Dt − 1 (26)
By using the relationship Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
= Zt +Kt+1, Eq. (26) can also be rewritten as
Kt+1 =
(Dt − 1 + β)
(
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
))
2Dt − 1 (27)
By substituting Kt+1 into Eq. (25) and solving for Yt we get
Yt =
(2Dt − 1)(1 + b(Dt))
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1)Xt +
α(1− β)
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1)Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
(28)
As we can see from Eq. (28), the total harvesting, Yt, is influenced by both b(Dt) and
Dth(Dt, Xt). By using Eq. (28) and substituting it into Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) we get
respectively20
Zt =
(Dt − β)
[
Xt(1 + b(Dt))−Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1) (29)
Kt+1 =
(Dt + β − 1)
[
Xt(1 + b(Dt))−Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1) (30)
By substituting Eq. (28) into the law of motion, Xt+1 = [Xt (1 + b(Dt))− Yt]α we obtain
Xt+1 =

α(1− β)
[
(1 + b(Dt))Xt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1)


α
(31)
finally, by assuming α = 1/2 and by evaluating at the steady state we get Eq. (13).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The non trivial steady state X∗2 is unique and, under Assumption 1, can only takes positive
values. Moreover, the steady state implicitly defined by Eq. (12) is locally stable if
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
∂X∗

 12(1− β)
[
(1 + a− cD)X∗ −De (X∗D )2]
1
2(1− β) + (2D − 1)


1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1
20As we can see from Eq. (30), the equilibrium level of Zt is a fraction of Xt, which satisfies the assumption
made in Section 3.2.
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where we have set α = 12 and plugged the functional forms for b(D) and h(X/D). Which
means
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1 + a− cD)(1− β) (4D2 − e(1− β)−D(1 + β))
2(4D − 1− β) (D(4D − 1) + e− (D + e)β)
√
D2(1+a−cD)2(β−1)2
(D(4D−1)+e−(D+e)β)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1
evaluated at (14). The above inequality admits two solutions:
1
8
(
1+β−
√
1− 16e+ 2β + 16eβ + β2
)
< D <
1
8
(
1+β+
√
1− 16e+ 2β + 16eβ + β2
)
and
D <
1
24
(
3 + 3β −
√
3
√
3 + 16e+ 6β − 16eβ + 3β2
)
∨
D >
1
24
(
3 + 3β −
√
3
√
3 + 16e+ 6β − 16eβ + 3β2
)
Since we are in a strategic setting, we impose D ≥ 2. The first solution satisfies this
condition only for negative values of the parameter e and hence cannot be accepted. As
for the second solution, the first inequality yields negative values of D and must hence be
rejected, while the second inequality is compatible with D ≥ 2 for e ≤ 6(7−β)1−β .
D >
1
24
(
3(1 + β) +
√
48e(1− β) + 9(1 + β)2
)
(32)
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We look at the derivative of Eq. (14) with respect to D.
∂X∗
∂D
=
[(1+a−2cD)(1−β)] [(D−4D2+βD)−e(1−β)]−(8D−1−β) [(1−β)(D+aD−cD2)]
[(D−4D2+βD)−e(1−β)]2
Since the denominator is always positive, the derivative can be either positive (X∗ increasing
in D) or negative (X∗ decreasing in D) depending on the sign of the numerator, which can
be simplified as follows
(1− β) [e(1 + a)(1− β)− 2ceD(1− β) +D2 (c(1 + β)− 4(1 + a))]
The term (1−β) is always positive (since 0 < β < 1), hence we concentrate our analysis on
the term in the square brackets. We obtain that the derivative equals zero (local maximum)
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when
e =
D2 [4(1 + a)− c(1 + β)]
(1− β)(1 + a− 2cD) with a > [c(1 + β)− 1]/4 (33)
Let us characterize the value of e such that the maximizing D is equal to 2 and to a/c (with
(a/c) > 2), respectively.
We obtain
eˆ =
4 [4(1 + a)− c(1 + β)]
(1− β)(1 + a− 4c) (34)
ˆˆe =
(a/c)2 [4(1 + a)− c(1 + β)]
(1− β)(1− a) with a < 1 (35)
Since Eq. (33) is monotonically increasing in D, when e ≤ eˆ the maximum stock of the
resource is found for D = 2, while for every eˆ < e < ˆˆe it will be found for an integer D > 2
and, finally, for D = a/c when e = ˆˆe.
7.4 Strategic resource harvesting in the cooperative framework
Equation 16 can be rewritten as follows
ln(1− β) + βlnKt − βlnZt + lnzit + lnβ + (1− β)lnZt+1 − (1− β)lnKt+1 + lnkit+1
Once again, the maximization problem is solved by substituting kit+1 = y
i
t−h
(
Xt
Dt
)
−zit and
Zt+1 = ηt+1Xt+1 into Eq. (16). Since communities cooperate, Yt = Dtyt and Zt = Dtzt,
and we obtain the following first-order conditions with respect to zit and y
i
t
1
zit
−βDt
Zt
+
(1− β)Dt
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
− Zt
− 1
yit − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
−zit
= 0 (36)
− α(1− β)Dt
Xt(1 + b(Dt))− Yt−
(1− β)Dt
Yt −Dt
(
Xt
Dt
)
− Zt
+
1
yit − h
(
Xt
Dt
)
−zit
= 0 (37)
By solving Eq. (36) for Zt we get
Zt = (1− β)
[
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
(38)
By using the relationship Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
= Zt +Kt+1, Eq. (38) can also be rewritten as
Kt+1 = β
[
Yt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
(39)
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By substituting Kt+1 into Eq. (37) and solving for Yt we get
Yt =
Xt (1 + b(Dt)) +Dtα(1− β)h
(
Xt
Dt
)
α(1− β) + 1 (40)
Yt is influenced by both b(Dt) and Dth(Dt, Xt). By using Eq. (40) and substituting it into
Eq. (38) and Eq. (39) we get respectively21
Zt = (1− β)
(
Xt(1 + b(Dt))−Dth(XtDt )
α(1− β) + 1
)
(41)
and
Kt+1 = β

Xt (1 + b(Dt))−Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)
α(1− β) + 1

 (42)
By substituting Eq. (40) into the law of motion, Xt+1 = [Xt (1 + b(Dt))− Yt]α we obtain
Xt+1 =

α(1− β)
[
(1 + b(Dt))Xt −Dth
(
Xt
Dt
)]
α(1− β) + 1


α
(43)
finally, by assuming α = 1/2 and by evaluating at the steady state we get Eq. (18).
7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
In the cooperative setting, the non trivial steady state XC2 is unique and, under Assumption
1, can take positive values only. Moreover, the steady state implicitly defined by Eq. (17)
is locally stable if
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
∂XC


1
2(1− β)
[
(1 + a− cD)XC −De
(
XC
D
)2]
1
2(1− β) + 1


1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 1
where we have set α = 12 and plugged the functional forms for b(D) and h(X/D). Which
means ∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1 + a− cD)(β − 1)(e+D(β − 3)− eβ)
2(D(β − 3) + e(β − 1))(β − 3)
√
D2(1+a−cD)2(β−1)2
(D(β−3)+e(β−1))2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1
evaluated at (19).
The above inequality admits two distinct solutions
21As we can see from Eq. (41), the equilibrium level of Zt is a fraction of Xt, which satisfies the assumption
made in Section 4.1.
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D <
e(1− β)
β − 3
and
D >
e(1− β)
3(3− β)
The first solution cannot be accepted as it gives negative values of D. As for the second
solution, since we are in a cooperative framework, we have to impose that D ≥ 1, which
gives us in turn the following condition on e: e ≥ 3(3−β)1−β .
7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
We look at the derivative of Eq. (19) with respect to D
∂XC
∂D
=
(3−β) [D(1+a−cD)(1−β)]− [(1+a−cD)(1−β)] [D(3−β)+e(1−β)]
[D(3−β) + e(1− β)]2
Since the denominator is always positive, we concentrate our analysis on the numerator
(1− β) [e(1 + a)(1− β)− cD (D(3− β) + 2e(1− β))] (44)
The term (1− β) is positive (since 0 < β < 1), hence we obtain that the derivative equals
zero (local maximum) when
e =
cD2 (3− β)
(1− β)(1 + a− 2cD) with a > 2cD − 1 (45)
Let us characterize the value of e such that the maximizing D is equal to 1 and to a/c (with
(a/c) > 1), respectively. We obtain
e˜ =
c(3− β)
(1− β)(1 + a− 2c) (46)
˜˜e =
c(3− β)
(1− β)(1− a) with a < 1 (47)
Since Eq. (33) is monotonically increasing in D, when e ≤ e˜ the maximum stock of the
resource is found for D = 2, while for every e˜ < e < ˜˜e it will be found for an integer D > 2
and, finally, for D = a/c when e = ˜˜e.
7.7 Strategic resource harvesting with a lump-sum transfer
We characterize the community maximization problem
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max
zit,k
i
t+1
ln
[
(1− β)K
β
t
Zβt
zit
]
+ ln
[
β
Z1−βt+1
K1−βt+1
kit+1
]
(48)
s.t.


Xt+1 =
(
Xt(1 + b(Dt))−
Dt∑
i=1
yit
)α
Zt+1 = Zt+1 (Xt+1)
Equation (48) can be rewritten as follows
ln(1− β) + β lnKt − β lnZt + ln zit + lnβ + (1− β) lnZt+1 − (1− β) lnKt+1 + ln kit+1
The community maximization problem is solved by substituting kit+1 = y
i
t−h
(
Xt
Dt
)
−zit−ω
and Zt+1 = ηXt+1 into Eq. (48). As in the symmetric Nash equilibrium y
i
t = y
j
t and z
i
t = z
j
t
∀i, j = 1...D, we obtain the following first order conditions with respect to zit and yit
1−β
Yt−Dt
(
h
(
Xt
Dt
)
+ω
)
−Zt
=
1
(1−τ)yit−h
(
Xt
Dt
)
−zit−ω
− 1
zit
+
β
Zt
(49)
1−β
Yt−Dt
(
h
(
Xt
Dt
)
+ω
)
−Zt
=
1
(1−τ)yit−h
(
Xt
Dt
)
−zit−ω
− α(1− β)
Xt(1+b(Dt))−Yt (50)
By solving Eq. (49) for Zt we get
Zt =
(Dt − β)
[
Yt −Dt
(
h
(
Xt
Dt
)
+ ω
)]
2Dt − 1 (51)
By using the relationship Yt−Dth ((Dt, Xt) + ω) = Zt+Kt+1, Eq. (51) can also be rewritten
as
Kt+1 =
(Dt − 1 + β)
[
Yt −Dt
(
h
(
Xt
Dt
)
+ ω
)]
2Dt − 1 (52)
By substituting Kt+1 into Eq. (50) and solving for Yt we get
Yt =
(2Dt − 1)(1 + b(Dt))Xt + α(1− β)Dt
(
h
(
Xt
Dt
)
+ ω
)
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1) (53)
By substituting Eq. (53) into the law of motion, Xt+1 = [Xt(1 + b(Dt))− Yt]α, we get
Xt+1 =
α(1− β)[Xt(1 + b(Dt)−Dt
(
h
(
Xt
Dt
)
+ ω
)
]
α(1− β) + (2Dt − 1) (54)
by assuming α = 1/2 and by evaluating at the steady state we obtain Eq. (22).
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7.8 Proof of Proposition 5
For any ω 6= 0, Eq. (22) has two distinct roots, Xωa and Xωb
Xωa =
D(1+a−cD)(1−β)−
√
∆
2 [D(4D−1)+e−β(D+e)] (55)
Xωb =
D(1+a−cD)(1−β)+
√
∆
2 [D(4D−1)+e−β(D+e)] (56)
where ∆ = D2(β−1) [(1+a−cD)2(β−1)+4ω (D(4D−1)+e−β(D+e))].
In order to find the optimal ω∗ (that is the ω that allows to decentralize the cooperative
outcome) we impose
Xωa,b = X
C
After some algebra we get
ω∗(D) = −4D(D − 1)(1 + a− cD)
2(1− β)
(D(3− β) + e(1− β))2 (57)
which is exactly Eq. (23). Because both the numerator and the denominator of Eq. (57)
are always positive for D ≥ 2, ω∗ turns out to be a positive transfer: in order to discourage
the young from harvesting, instead of levying a tax on the harvest, the government gives
them a transfer, which is financed through a tax on capital.
Moreover, since by plugging Eq. (23) into Eq. (56), Xωa turns out to be always negative,
we can assert that the positive steady state Xω is unique.
We are finally interested in studying the stability of the positive steady state. In order
to do that, we have to identify for which conditions the absolute value of the derivative of
Xωt+1 w.r.t. X
ω
t evaluated in Eq. (56) and Eq. (23) is lower than 1. Due to the complexity
of the derivative, we are not able to find explicit conditions on D and the parameter e which
ensures that the absolute value of the derivative is lower than 1, as done in Proposition 4.1
and Proposition 4.3. However, it is possible to study its limit behaviour. In particular,
considering the parameter e it is possible to prove that
lim
e→0+
∣∣∣∣∂Xωt+1∂Xωt
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
√
(1 + a− cD)(1− β)
2(4D − 1− β)R
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1
where R =
(1+a−cD)(1−β)+
√
D2(1+a−cD)2(1−β)2(5−8D+β)2)
(3−β)2
4D−1−β with D ≤ 1+ac .
Since the denominator is always bigger than the nominator, the condition is satisfied.
Similarly, we compute
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lim
e→+∞
∣∣∣∣∂Xωt+1∂Xωt
∣∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣∣(1−β)M (1+D−β+e(D−β))+2 (DN+e(1−β)))+e (M (D(1−β)+D−β))2√2N(1−β) (M (M(D−β)+1))
∣∣∣∣∣ > 1
which is always bigger then 1 for e→ +∞ and where M = 1+ a− cD and N = 4D− 1− β
with D ≤ 1+ac .
Since the derivative is continuous, it means that there exist a e > 0 for which the
condition on the stability of the steady state is satisfied.
7.9 Proof of Corollary 1
Let D¯ be the number of communities for which XCmax is reached in the cooperative frame-
work. We impose
Xω(D) = XCmax
and we obtain
ω¯ = − D¯(1+a−cD¯)(1−β)(
D2(D¯(3−β)+e(1−β))2)Θ < 0 (58)
where
Θ = D¯
(
4(1+a)D−D2 (4(1+a) + c(3−β))−e(1+a)(1−β) +De(1+a−cD)(1−β)+
+ cD¯2 (D(4D−1)+e−β(D+e))
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